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INSURABLE INTEREST IN LIFE INSURANCE.
NATURE OF THE CONTRACT OF LIFE INSURANCE.

A contract of life insurance is unlike one of fire or marine
insurance. These are contracts for indemnity, contracts to reimburse for a loss of property that shall be actually suffered. The
contract of life insurance is a contract to pay a definite sum of
money upon the occurrence of the death of a certain person. The
payableness of this sum is not contingent on the proof that by
this death the claimant has suffered a loss measurable in money.
equal to the moiey the payment of which the contract compels.'
OBJECTION TO WAGERING POLICY.

A contract of life insurance contemplates the payment of a
sum of money to one, upon the death of another. The earlier the
death, the sooier the money is to be paid. The earlier the death,
the smaller the amount of money which the beneficiary must pay,
when the contract assumes the ordinary form. In its ordinary
form, the insured must pay premiums from time to time during
his life, or he must pay assessments which are imposed from
time to time during his life. The briefer the life, the smaller the
,number of the premiums or of the assessments will be. When then,
A takes out a policy upon his own life, or that of another, he
thinks of the possibility or probability that the cestui quc vie will
die sooner than the expiration of the term of his expectancy.
In that case he will be a gainer. Should the death, however, not
'Elliott's Appeal, 50 Pa. 75; Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. 6.
(29)
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occur until after the expiration of that term, he will pay into the
insuring company, more than he will receive from it, and will
be a loser. The taking out of a policy may be prompted by the
instinct which leads to wagers generally and to lotteries, that of
winning values upon the turn of chance, without proportional
effort 6r expense. This objecfion however, to life insurance has
not prevailed. "All life insurance" said Paxson, C.J., "is in one
sense speculative. Yet within proper restrictions it has been found
to be highly beneficent, and not in coiiflict with public policy. It
enables a man ,in the days of his early struggles, to provide for
his family in case of his death. It renders it possible for a business
man to borrow the capital needed for success. It furnishes the
means and the only means by which a creditor may sometimes
secure a doubtful claim. Yet in all these cases, there is the
element of speculation, for, if the assured dies shortly after tile
policy is issued, the beneficiary, whether he be a 1lood r-elation
or a creditor, gets a sum of money greatly disproporfioned to tile
amount paid. But in these cases the law does not regard the
2 speculative element as a danger."
TEMPTATION TO CRIME.

The effect of the contract of life insurance that has most
excited the apprehensions of the law-makers, has been, not the
tendency to develop the speculative habit; the cupidity for things
as gifts of fate or chance, rather than as guerdons of thrift skill,
and effort, but the tendency to lead to homicide. Since the earlier
the death of the subject of the insurance, the less the cost of it,
and the sooner the obtaining of the money secured by the policy.
the beneficiary is under a temptation to hasten the death, in
order to escape'a part of the cost, and in order quickly to reap
the benefit of the policy. There is a "tendency to create a desire"
for the death of the subject.' Said Gordon, J. "We have within
our own knowledge. a case in which a wager policy on a life,
resulted in murder."'4 "The records of our court" says Paxson,
'Ulrich v. Reinoehl, 143 Pa. 238. An agreement by the insurance company not to set tip the wagering character of the policy as a defense,
would be void, Brady v. Prudential Ins. Co., 5 Iulp, 505.
'U. B. Mnt. Aid Soc. v. McDonald, 122 Pa. 324. Gilbert v. Moose, 104
Pa. 74; Cooper v. Shaffer, 20 W. N. 123; McDermott v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 7 Kulp, 246;
'Gilbert v. Moose, 104 Pa. 74;
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C.J., "show that it [speculative insurance] sometimes leads to
murder.": ;
MET-IODS OF AVOIDANCE SELECTED.

Since the contract of insurance inevitably makes it pro tanto
for the advantage of the beneficiary, that the insured should die
soon, and so exposes the former to a temptation to compass the
death of the latter, the risk will be reduced, if the number of
possible insurarices is restricted. If every body could secure the
insurance of the life of every body, there might be a thousand
insurances on each life. If enemies as well as friends, could
insure a man, if those having no business or social interest in
him, could insure him, as well as those who had such interest,
the number of insurances on lives would be multiplied, and the
danger of murder be correspondingly increased. It i§ evident
that a rule that allowed only one or other small number of insurances, of the same man, or .that allowed parents only, or children,
to obtain insurances, would keep the number of insurances small,
and ipso facto, lessen attempts at murder in order to accelerate
payment of the policies. The law might also adopt the principle
that no policy should be valid, except when it was in favor of a
person who would have probably a desire for the prolongation
of the life of the assured, despite the interest in his early death,
which the policy would tend to engender. The latter principle
is the one which the courts have adopted, in order to lessen the occasions for crime; furnished by the insurance of lives. The holder
of the policy, they say, must have an "insurable-interest," a phrase
which means an interest independent of insurance itself, in the
continuance oftthe life, of the insured. "It is not easy" says Justice
Field" "to define with precision what will in all cases constitute
an insurable interest, so as to take the contract out of the class of
wager policies. It may be stated generally, however, to be such
an interest, arising from the relations of the party obtaining the
insurance, either as creditor of, or as surety for the assured, or
from the ties of blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance
'Ulrich v. Reinoehl, 143 Pa. 238. Church, P. J. said that murder has
been committed to get the insurance money, and persons have been hung
for it; McArthur v. Chase, 5 Sadler 67. The object of the rules against
wagering policies, has been to prevent fraud and crime: Brennan v.

Franey, 142 Pa. 301.
'Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775.
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of his life. It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage
or benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation, for
a parent has an insurable interest in the life of his child, and a
child in the life of his parent, a husband in the life of his wife,
and a wife in the life of her husband. The natural affection in
cases of this kind is considered as more powerful-as operating
more efficaciously to protect the life of the insured than any other
consideration.

7

RELATIONS OF BLOOD OR MARRIAGE.

The mere relation of father and son furnishes no obstacle
to the murder of the former by the latter. Parricides; the killing
of sons, are not unknown to the history of crime. But it is
ordinarily accompanied, in the father, by a strong affection; in
opposition to which, money, property, appeals but feebly. In
the son there is usually a filial, respect, deference, and love in
face of which no pecuniary gain, however great, would furnish
a temptation to the killing of the parent, to say nothing of the
horror of homicide, in any form, so dominant among modern
races of men. But, there are parents who do not love their offspring; who would with not extreme reluctance, witness, nay even
cause, their death, if by so doing, they could enrich themselves.
There are sons. who prefer their own present advancement in
life, to the continuance in being, of their parents. Will the courts
say that a policy, in behalf of a son, and a father, is unenforceable, unless that son loves his father, or that father the son to a
normal degree? They have never done so. No case appears in
Pennsylvania, in which the effort was made to have the policy
declared a wager, because of defect of natural affection of the
beneficiary for the insured. Were the tffort made it would probably be unsuccessful. It must also be remembered that 'policies
are not all for the same amount. The chance of getting $100,000
by the death of a father, might influence a son with a desire to
kill him as a means, while the chance of obtaining $100 or $1000
would leave him uncorrupted. Yet, there is no case in Pennsylvaiia which considers the size of the policy as an element to be
weighed, in determining whether, when it is in favor of a son,
or father, it is to be deemed a wager or not. A son can take
out a policy of $1,000,000, upon his father, and enforce it.
'Corson's Appeal 113 Pa. 438; Cooper v. Shaeffer, 20 W. N. 123.
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THE RELATIONS WHICH NEGATIVE WAGER.

It is interesting to know what are the relations the mere
existence of which preserves policies upon one in favor of another
bearing-such relations, from being condemnable as wagers.
HUSBAND, WIFE.

A wife is ordinarily bound to her husband by a strong tie
of affection. The feeling is more or less strongly reciprocated.
She may expect aid and support from him, when he is able to
render it. His own love instigates him to render them. The law
likewise impresses upon him the duty of giving them. Her love
embraces the desire for the perpetuation of her intercourse with
him, that is, of his continuance in life. A policy on his life,
payable to her is not a wager.8 If B,a woman, marries A, of whose
earlier marriage to a woman who is still living, and from whom
he has not been divorced, she has no knowledge, she has an insurable interest in his life. 9 The cessation after the issue of a
policy of the marital relation by divorce, does not impair it."°
The situation of a husband is not precisely like that of a wife.
She is under no legal duty to furnish him a support. His affection
for her is apt not tor be as vivid and self-forgetting as hers for
him. Nevertheless, a policy upon her life,originally payable to
2
him," or made payable to him by a subsequent assignment,
may be enforced by him.
PARENT.

A parent has a right to effect an insurance upon his or her
child's life, so as to obtain a sum 'of money as a solace for it's
departure from this sublunary sphere." Maintenance of a father
or mother, unable to work, is a legal duty [towards the public
at least] of the child, 4 and the parent therefore, has a selfish
basis for the wish that the child may live. He usually has the
parental affection for the child, which would abhor its killing.
'McDonald v. Gibbons, 14 Dist. 668; Corson's Appeal 113 Pa. 438. It
is said that a single woman has an insurable interest in the life of her
intended husband; 113 Pa. 438.
'Mueller's Estate, 32 Pitts, L. J. 326; Hawkins, J. The question was
not decided in Overbeck v. Overbeck, 155 Pa. 5.
"Life Co. v. Schaffer, 94 U. S. 457; Corson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438;
Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. 6.
"Speck v. Hettinger, 2 Sadler, 474; Wegman v. Smith, 16 W. N. 186.
'Wheeland v. Alwood, 192 Pa. 237.
"Corson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438..
"Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kane, 81 Pa. 154.

34
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A-CHILD.

A daughter' 5 or son" has an insurable interest in the father.
A son'17 or daughter has the same interest in the mother. In
justification of a policy on a father, in favor of a son, the supreme
court.said.1 8 "By the 28th section of the Poor Law of June 13th,
1876, the father and grandfather, and the mother and grandmother, and the children and grand-children of every poor person, not able to work, shall, at their own charge, being
of sufficient ability, relieve and maintain such poor person, at
such rate as the Court of Quarter Sessions of the proper county
shall order and direct." Maintenance of a father or mother
unable to work is therefore, a legal .liability. When we add to
this, the feelings of natural affection and the desire produced bl
these feelings to provide for the comfort of parents, the right
to effect an insurance on the life of the parent, to'carry out these
purposes, ought not to be denied. "As the father may become
poor, or may die, leaving his wife to survive, the son may.
reasons the court, have to provide for both. Why then should
he not be permitted to make a provision by insurance, to reimburse himself for their outlays past or future? What injury is
done to the insurance company? They have received the full premium, etc."
INSURED IN LOCO PARENTIS.

A man or woman, not the parent of X. may conceive an interest in X; desire to support X, and variously assist X; may send
him or her to school, payifig the expenses. If such man or
woman, in addition takes out a policy upon his own life, for
$2000, payable to himself or herself, and, a few days later, assigns
it to X, seals the policy and the assignment in a package, and
delivers it to X, with the injunction not to open it until after his or
her death, and X is ignorant of the contents of the package,
until after the death, the policy is enforceable against the insurance
company by X. X has an insurable interest. "It does not matter"
says Dean, J. "that this interest was one without legal obligation
on the part of the insured; it was a relation in every other respect
parental; pecuniarily and otherwise, he assumed a parent's part
towards her, and she was justified in expecting the continuance of
"Brennan v. Franey, 142 Pa. 301.
"Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kane, 81 Pa. 154.
"Hoffman v. Hoke, 122 Pa. 377.

"Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kane, 81 Pa. 154.
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it."'" As X had no knowledge of the policy, it ought not to have
mattered whether she had received other benefits or not. They
would have led her to expect a continuation of them, possibly,
and would thus have counteracted the desire, awakened by the
fact'that, at her benefactor's death, she would get $2000,for his
early dedth. But, if she did not know of the policy, it could not
20
flave wrought in her such a desire. In McGraw v. Life Ins. Co.
the father of the plaintiff (niece of the insured) had died when
she was two and a half years old; her mother had married again;
the insured, her uncle, had raised her and been a father to her
all her life; she had lived with him until her marriage,and since
her marriage had lived next door to him, where he resided with his
sisters. The niece always helped to support them; [i.e. the uncle
and aunts] "Upon this evidence," says Reeder, J. "the case was
properly submitted to the jury, and they would have been justified
in determining the question in her favor," a suit against the insurance Company. It is not said whether the niece was aware of the
policy during the uncle's life-time. How the fact that she had
"helped to support" was relevant, is not said. It would show affection for him, but beyond the special relations of parent and child,
husband and wife, affection of the beneficiary towards the insured
is unimportant. So far as it appears, the aid and services of the
uncle may have ceased before the issue of the policy, orhemayhave
grown so poor as to extinguish in the niece's mind, the expectation
of any continuance of them.
ONE IN LOCO PARENTIS THE BENEFICIARY.

Possibly.when A, (an aunt,) has assumed the relation of
parent to B, (a nephew) who is 19 years of age, she may take
out a policy for $190 payable to her, upon his life, and enforce it
against the company. 21
BROTHER AND SISTER.

It has been decided by the supreme court of the United
States2 2 that a sister, married, not living with her brother, not
"Carpenter v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 161 Pa. 9.
5 Super. 488. It does not appear whether the policy was payable to
the niece or had been assigned to her.
'Weber v. Life Ins. Co., 172 Pa. 111. The policy was taken out 26

months before death of the nephew. Some time before and after he had
been living and continued to live, with the beneficiary. The stress of the
contest, was concerning alleged misrepresentations to the company about
the health of the insured. A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by an

equally divided supreme court.
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dependent on him for support, although her husband was of small
means, and was earning his living as a ladies' shoemaker, had
an insurable interest in her brother's life, although he was intending to marry, and in fact married the day after the issue of the
policy, which named her as beneficiary. "Where, as in this case"
says Bradley, J. "a brother takes out a policy on his own life for the
benefit of his sister [here for $10,000] it is wholly immaterial
what arrangements they choose to make between them about the
payment of the premiums. The policy is not a wager policy. It
is divested of these dangerous tendencies which render such
policies contrary to good morals. And, as the company gets a
perfect quid pro quo in the stipulated premiums it cannot justly
refuse to pay the insurance when incurred by the terms of the
Qpntract." A sister who was named as beneficiary in a policy
upon her brother's life, and who paid the premiums, was allowed
to recover against the-insurance company3 Possibly a brother
has no such interest in his sister's life, that qua brother, he may
enforce a policy on her life against the company. 24 He may have
to her, however, the relation of creditor to debtor, and for that
reason have an insurable interest. If he is supporting and maintaining her in his family so as to become
her creditor, he may
25
enforce a policy in his favor on her life.
SON-IN-LAW-STEP-SON.

A son-in-law hes no insurable interest in the life of his father27

in-law 26 or of his mother-in-law.

A step-son 28 or step-daughteyr

2 9

has no insurable interest in the step-father's or step-mother's life.
"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U. S. 561. Cited without disapproval; Corson's Appeal 113 Pa. 438; Keystone Mut. Assn. v. Beaverson,

16 W. N. 188.
'Early v. Life Ins. Co., 10 York, 13.
'Mullen v. Ins. Co., 182 Pa. 150; 7 Kulp, 422; Mut Assn. v. Beaverson,
16 W. N. 188.
'16 W. N. 188; 7 Kulp 422. In 182 Pa. 150, Fell, J. declined to consider whether a brother, as such, has an insurable interest in the life of his
sister, although the question was in the case.
"Ramsey v. Myers, 6 Dist. 468.
'Stoner v. Line, 16 W. N. 187; Stambaugh v. Blake, 22 W. N., 407;
The question was not decided in Mut. Benefit Assn..v. Norris, 115 Pa. 446.

'U. B. Mut. Aid Soc. v. McDonald, 122 Pa. 324.
'Chidester v. Yard, 155 Pa. 480; Blake v. Metzgar, 150 Pa. 291.
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OTHER *RELATIONS.

Neither the nephew0 3 nor niece 31 has as such an insurable interest in an aunt's life or an uncle's. The son of the wife of A (i.e.
A's step-son) A being a son of X, has no interest in the life of
X.32 A and B being husband and wife, the father of A has no
insurable interest in the life of the mother of B,3 3 nor has the
brother of the wife of X, in X's life,34 or generally, a brother-inlaw in the life of a brother-in-law.35

Cousins have no insurable

interest in the lives of each other, 36 whether their parents are full
brothers and sisters or only half brothers and sisters.37 The
daughter of X has no interest in the life of the wife of the first
38
cousin of X

HEIRS,DISTRIBUTEES.

A man can insure his own life, naming his executor or administrator the beneficiary. He may direct that the money be paid,
at his death to his devisees or, if none, to his heirs. Even though
those who prove to be his "heirs" '39 are his widow, and his brothers
and sisters, or nephews and nieces, they will be entitled to rereceive themoney as against the executor ;40 that is, apparently an
insurable interest is not necessary when the member of a beneficial
society has directed in the certificate that the money be paid to
41
devisees, if any, if none, to distributees.
"Corson's Appeal 113 Pa. 438.
'Crone v. Prudental Ins. Co., 11 Dist. 433. A niece, probably, has, as
such no insurable interest in the uncle's life; McGraw v. Ins. Co., 5 Super.

488.

"Gilbert v. Moose, 104 Pa. 74.
"Batdorff v. Fehler, 6 Sadler, 559.
'McHale v. McDonnell, 175 Pa. 632.
"Grant v. Kline, 115 Pa. 618.
'Brennan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 148 Pa. 198.
"Brady v. Prudential Ins. Co., 5 Kulp, 505.

'McDermott v. Prudential Ins. Co., 7 Kulp, 246.
'Understood to be equivalent to distributees.
"'Masonic Aid Assn. v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99. The policy was issued in
Illinois, but the member being domiciled in Pennsylvania, the law of this
state designated the distributees of his personal estate and therefore the
"heirs" in the sense of the certificate. The executor was not entitled, although there were creditors. The Association paid the money into court
and filea an interpleader bill.
"It is even said that a person has an insurable interest in his own life,
and that his right "to insure it for his heirs or even for a stranger, cannot
be questioned" citing Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. 6.
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OTHER FACTS WHICH ARE EQUIVALENT TO INSURABLE INTEREST.

Besides the domestic relations there may be relations which
will support a policy of insurance on the life of one, in favor of

another, bearing to each other one of these relations. Dean, J.
mentions a "moral obligation" as sufficient to support a policy;
the relation of partners, the relation of superintendent or manager of a business concern to his employer as sufficient to give one
partner, or the employer, an insurable interest in the life of the
42
other partner, or of the, superintendent or manager.
THE BENEFICIARY"S OR ASSIGNEE'S IGNORANCE.

If the beneficiary or assignee of a policy, has no knowledge
of its existance, he can not be influenced by it, either to develop
the habit of gambling and speculation, or to scheme for the early
death of the insured. The insured is allowed by law to give his
property to anotler, at his death, arid even to leave in existence a
written memorial of the gifts; e.g. a will; a bond payable at death,
There is no reason that, allowed to give specific chattels at death,
he shouud not be allowed to give choses in action. Nor, if he may
contract with X to pay him, that is, to pay his executor or administrator, a sum of money at death, is there any good" reason for
prohibiting his contracting with X to pay anybody else, provided
that in so doing, he does not furnish a motive to Y to commit a
crime. "It would" says Paxson, J. "be denying a man's right to
do what he will with his own, to say that he could not .in any form
insure his life for the benefit of an indigent relative, or a friend to
whom he felt under obligation. 4 3 "This right" says Paxson, C.J.
"results from the right which a man has, to dispose of his own
property.

44

THE BENEFICIARY S PASSIVITY.

There are cases which hold that, since a man may do what

he will with his own, he may pay for a policy, and make another,
4
Carpenter
3

v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 161 Pa. 9.
" Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. 6. The first notice the beneficiary had of
the policy was after the death of the assured. Cf. also, Masonic Aid Assn.
v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99; Overbeck v. Overbeck, 155 Pa. 5.
"Hill v. United Life Ins. Assn., 154 Pa. 29. But here, the ignorance
of the assignee or beneficiary did not exist, and was not adverted to. Ten
persons, having severally obtained policies for $10,000, payable to their
administrators, concurrently transferred them to a trustee to be held by
him for the benefit on the death of any one, of the survivors of the ten.
The survivors had a right to the money.
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irrespective of any insurable interest, his beneficiary, and the
beneficiary will be entitled. A man already married, married X,
and lived with her from January 1881 to May 1889. On June
14th, 1886, he effected an insurance on his life, payable to X, or
to his heirs. He showed the policy to her and told her it was
hers. Not deciding that X had an insurable interest in his life,
the court held that she was nevertheless entitled to the money,
and not the first wife. "It was held" says the Court, "in Scott
v. Dickson, 108 Pa. 6 that a man may insure his own life, paying
the premiums himself for the benefit of another, who has no
insurable interest, and that such transaction is not a wagering
''
policy. 4

IMPORTUNITY OF BENEFICIARY.

If A can spontaneously insure his life for the benefit of
another who has no insurable interest., may he do so if the suggestion comes from that other? B persuades A to give him the
fruits of a policy, that is to apply for it, to pay the initial and all
subsequent premiums, or assessments, and to designate B as the
recipient of the money. Can B obtain and retain the money?
How can we distinguish between the case in which A. without
suggestion or entreaty from B, insures for B, and the case in
which his interest in B is so tepid, as to require some stimulation
from B? Would it not be absurd to hold a policy in the latter
case unavailable for B, while holding it available for him in the
former case? In both cases, A is doing what he will with his
own contracting power, and money. He is using them to secure a
gratuity for B. In both B is aware of the existence of the right
to receive the money conditioned upon the death of A. In both,
B might be tempted to procure the early death of A.
PREMIUMS PAID BY BENEFICIARY.

It is imaginable that the initial and all later premiums should
be paid by the beneficiary, or that the initial be paid by the assured
and all later by the beneficiary, or that several of the earlier premiums be paid by the insured, and the later by the beneficiary. What
will be the effect of these payments of the premiums, all or some,
by the beneficiary, who has no insurable interest? In such a case,
the money ultimately paid on the policy is only in part the money
of the insured. It is in part that of the beneficiary. Apparently. if

'Overbeck v. Overbeck, 155 Pa. 5. Cf. Carpenter v. U. S. Ins. Co.,
161 Pa.
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A cares enough for B to pay all the premiums on a policy and yet
designate B as the beneficiary, B has an enforceable right to the
money; but if A cares so much less for B that he is simply willing
to allow B to take out the policy, bearing the whole expense of it,
B will not be able to enforce the policy.40 The fact that B is
sufficiently desirous to have the policy, to be willing to pay the
premiums, seemingly indicates a mind that might be betrayed into
murder, or, at least, an unamiable willingness to speculate upon the
length of the insured's life. For either or both reasons, the policy
will not avail him.
NAMING BENEFICIARY AND ASSIGNING,

One who has no insurable interest in A's life, may be made
interested in it, or rather its quick termination, either by being
named as beneficiary in the policy, or in the certificate of membership of a beneficial society, or by becoming the assignee of
such policy or certificate. There may be an understanding, at
the taking of the policy, that it shall be at once assigned, and
it may be thus assigned ;47 or, the intention to assign may be formed later. There is probably no difference in effect, between the
naming of X a beneficiary, 48 and the making him such, by a
subsequent assignment. If the former would not be able to enforce the contract for his own benefit, neither would the latter, and
vice versa. In Gilbert v. Moose49 a certificate for $2000, on A's
life was made payable to B, who two weeks later, assigned it for
$28 to C. C thus became liable to pay the assesssments, and paid
them to the amount of $81. A died eight months after the issue of
"Chidester v. Yard, 155 Pa. 483. If B, the beneficiary, gives the money
to A unconditionally, which A uses in paving the assessments, B may en-

force the policy. If B gives it to A in order that A may use it in paying the
assessments, B may not enforce the policy. If B, without the knowledge of
A, takes out a policy on A's life, in which B is named as beneficiary, and
subsequently B, himself without insurable interest, assigns the policy to
one having an insurable interest; e.g. the wife of A, on her promise to pay
him Y of what she shall get upon the policy, this promise will not be enforced. It has no consideration. Mc Donald v. Gibbons, 14 Dist. 668.
"If there is no insurable interest in the assignee, he will not be entitled to the money, Corson's Appeal, 113. Pa. 438; Keystone Mut. Ben.
Assn. v. Norris, 115 Pa. 446.
'Cf. Mut. Aid Society v. McDonald, 122 Pa. 324; Scott v. Dickson, 108
Pa. 6.
'104 Pa. 74. If a stranger is named as beneficiary, he paying the
original cost of securing the membership in the society, and the future assessments, the certificate is a wager, Seigrist v, Schmoltz, 113 Pa. 326.
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the certificate. Neither B nor C had an insurable interest. It
was held that neither B nor C could retain the money obtained
from the Relief Association, upon the certificate. The policy
may name the insured as payee, and he may immediately 'assign
it to X who pays the expense of. effecting it. The same principles
would regulate X's right as if he had been named as beneficiary. 5"
Boas having been named as beneficiary in the certificate, and having
paid the assessments for three years, transferred, for $65, the certificate to Downey, being unable longer to pay the assessments.
Says Sadler, P.J. "He became the beneficiary instead of Boas. His
bargain was a better one than if he had taken the policy at is inception, because the assured had paid $185.20 of assessments, and
received but $65 for the policy from him. Surely the fact that
he took the policy by assignment, gave him no greater interest in
the preser'vation of the life of the assured than if the policy had
been at first made payable to him. Boas's speedy dissolution
would be his gain in either case.""' Generally it may be said that
an assignee of a policy must have an insurable interest, to entitle
him to obtain and retain the whole f the money upon the policy.S
BUYING AN INTEREST IN

THE POLICY.

It has been said that, sinceA can do what he will with his own,
he can buy from an insurance company a right to receive at his
death, a sum of money and give this right to another. The other can
enforce it. However, A not being able or disposed to pay for a
policy on his life, except by the aid of B, cannot, seemingly, induce B to furnish this aid, by giving to him a share of the fruit
of the policy. A, 63 years old, solicited B to agree to support him
when he should be unable to work, and to take out a policy on A's
life. B agreed to pay the expense on a policy for $3000, to be
taken out by A; to support A, when he should be unable to work,
and to pay from the proceeds of the policy $200 for funeral
expenses. The policy was taken out, and all the assessments on
it paid for over two years, when A died. B being neither a relative nor a creditor of A, when the policy was taken out, could
retain, of the money paid on the policy, only what he expanded in
supporting and burying A, with interest thereon; and the assessments paid with interest thereon. The rest belonged to A's admin'Shaffer v. Spangler, 144 Pa. 223. An insurable interest was discovered.
'Downey v. Hoffer, 110 Pa. 109.
5
Vanormer v. Hornberger, 142 Pa, 575; Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. 6.
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istrator. 3 A man is thus prevented from providing fof his own
support and proper burial, by means of a policy upon his own life
which will probably yield at his death, more than the actual expenses of the person whom he tries to induce to furnish them.
He is solicitously prevented from exposing himself to mfirder,
at the expense of continuing exposed to death by starvation; so
kind are the judges! "The question" they say "is not one of
good faith, but of public policy,***. The intention of John
Schmoltz (B) in obtaining this policy may have been innocent and
pure, but thiS cannot be regarded, for the fact remains that he
was in no way interested to maintain the life of Jacob Seigrist
(A) and it is certain, the sooner that life was extinguished the
better it was, in a pecuniary point of view, for the beneficiary."
Nor, does it help the matter but rather the contrary, that the
defendant had charged himself with the support of Seigrist, for
all the more would his pecuniary interest be advanced by the
termination of Seigrist's life."
BUYING AN INTEREST IN ONE POLICY BY GIVING AN INTEREST
IN ANOTHER.

If A has a policy of $10,000 upon his life, and 9 other persons
have each, a similar policy on his life, they may assign to a trustee
these policies, in such a way that the survivors shall be entitled
to the proceeds of each policy; that is, A may assign to B, C, D,
etc. the right to receive the money upon his policy, in case they
survive him, in consideration of their assigning to him the right
of. receiving the money on their policies, should he survive them.
On the death of A, before any of the others, his heir at law or
administrator is not entitled to the money from the company,
if it has paid it to the trustee.5
ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT TO CREDITOR.

When the policy is given either originally, by naming him
as the beneficiary, or by a subsequent assignment of it, to a creditor, the intention may be that the creditor shall receive and retain
on the policy, at the debtor's death, only so much as shall equal
the debt and interest, and the expenses incurred by the creditor
"Seigrist v. Schmoltz, 113 Pa. 326.
"Hill v. Ins. Assn. 154 Pa. 29. Paxson, C. J. says the transaction was
not a gambling one; that A had a right to dispose of his policy as property.
He inconsequently suggests that possibly A's heirs could recover the money
from the trustee. How, on the principles announced is not apparent.
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in the procuring and maintaining of the policy. The policy is
then held as collateral security. But the intention may be
that the money obtained on the policy shall belong, all of 'it,
to the creditor. The policy is taken, virtually, as a substitut
for the debt. It may be taken -formally, also, as such substitute,
e.g. when a judgment is satisfied by the creditor, as a consideration for the policyr5 The interest which the creditor had,
prior to receiving the policy, was thus extinguished by that reception. Yet the cases are treated as if the creditor's desire for
the early death of the insured, is checked by his desire for the
continuance of the paying power of the insured, a palpable error.
How can it matter whether the consideration paid for a policy, is
paid by one not heretofore a creditor, or is paid by one heretofore
such; whether it is paid by something else than an existing debt
or by an existing debt? Plainly it cannot. Yet when for an
assignment of a policy, $2816 or $6557 was paid by one not a
creditor to that extent, the assignment was held without circumlocution, to be a wager, whereas when the price paid for the policy
was a pre-existing debt, the wagering quality of the transaction
was held determinable only by a rule, hereafter to be discussed.
If the policy is assigned absolutely to the creditor, apparently,
the subsequent payment of the debt does not destroy the assignee's
right to receive and retain the money."
WHAT ARE DEBTS.

The debt for which a policy can be assigned need not be
strictly such. A was indebted to B, and B took out policies on
A's life as security. After making payments of- the premiums on
these policies, they were abandoned, because of the insolvency
of the insuring company. Later, another policy was taken out
upon A's life. In deciding whether the policy was for too great
a sum, proportionate to the debt, the money paid to procure and
'Urich v. Reinoehl, 143 Pa. 238. The judgment was for $99.51. With
interest it amounted to $110.02, when the policy for $3000 was taken. In
Wheeland v. Atwood, 192 Pa. 237, a debt of $1900 was satisfied for the
assignment of a policy for $5000.
"Gilbert v. Moose, 104 Pa. 74.
"'Downey v. Hoffer, 110 Pa. 109.
"Corson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438. But, the only consideration for an
absolute assignment of a policy would be an extinction of the debt. If it
is extinct a later payment would be a solecism. In Elliott's executor's
Appeal, 50 Pa. 75, it is said that the cessation of the insurable interest
after the acquirement of the policy will not make it a wagering one.
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sustain the abandoned policies, could be counted as debt if. A
consented, as against his administrator. "We do not" says Paxson, J., "regard it as either unusual or wagering for Kline (B)
to attempt to secure the sums he had already fruitlessly paid in
premiums on Grant's (A's) life, and if Grant had no objection
thereto, and assisted him therein, I do not see that any one could
object to this but the company ."" A owing B $500, assigned to
him a policy for $2000. Fourteen months later, A suggested to
B, that as the company was not paying in full, the policy was
probably insufficient. Since the first policy he had become indebted to the extent of $250. He proposed the taking out of a
second policy for $2000, B promising to give him a respectable
burial, and to pay the expense of it. It was held that the two
policies were to be united. If $4000 would not be too large a sum
to protect all the debts, those before the issue of the first and
those arising after, B would have a right to retain all the money
received by him from the company, he having paid the expense of
the burial. 60
The debt may have began to exist before the acquiring by
the creditor of an interest in the policy, or it may begin simultaneously with the acquiring; or the policy may be for debts
already in existence and debts then begun. Thus, a debt for $400
already existing ; when the policy was assigned, an additional
loan was made of $100 at the time."' A debt arising from the
payment of the funeral expenses of A, to whom a policy, payable
to his administrator has been issued, does not give the person
paying an insurable interest.8 2
CREDITORS.

Creditors desire the continuance of the life of their debtors
sometimes. If a debtor is young, healthy, industrious, saving he
will probably produce money enough to repay the debt. The creditor will then believe himself benefited by the prolongation of his
"Grant v. Kline, 115 Pa. 618. The insurance company had paid the
money to creditor. The action was by the administrator of the debtor, to
recover from him a portion of this money.
'Shaffer v. Spangler, 144 Pa. 223. Though the funeral expenses were
not a debt existing when the policy was assigned, B contracted to pay them.
He ultimately did pay them. The policy is valid, unless disproportioned
to the debt, counting the funeral expenses ($65) a part of it.
'Shaffer v. Spangler, 144 Pa. 223.
'Crone v. Prudential Ins. Co., 11 Dist. 433.
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life. But suppose he is old, that he has lost his earning power
from physical or mental debility; that he is dishonest. The creditor may have little or no prospect of being benefited by the protraction of his life. In the former case, the creditor takes out a
policy on the debtor's life. If the policy is treated as sound, and the
company is solvent lie gets the money when the debtor dies. That
money may or may not be equal to the debt and the interest. If
it is only equal to the debt and the interest, he is still a loser, if he
has paid the premiums or the assessments. He is a loser, unless
the amount be finally realized from the policy is equal to the debt
and interest, plus the premiums or assessments and the interest
thereon. On the other hand he is a gainer ot the extent to which
the amount realized on the policy exceeds these sums. It must be
clear that in almost every case, when a creditor takes out a policy
upon his debtor's life, he diminishes his interest in the continuance
of the life of the debtor. The sooner the debtor dies, the sooner
will th6 debt be paid; the fewer likewise, will be the premiums
which must be paid in order to maintain the policy. Nevertheless,
the courts have been willing to allow creditors to take out insurance upon the life of debtors, saying that they have insurable interests. 63
COLLATERAL SECURITY.
64
A policy may be taken out as collateral security for a debt.
The debtor may agree to pay and pay the premiums; or a creditor
may pay them. Of the money obtained at last upon the policy
can be retained only so much as equals the debt and the interest
thereon, and the premiums or assessments, and the interest thereon, which the creditor has paid.6 5 If the debtor has paid them the
creditor may retain only the debt and interest.6 6- As the administrator of the debtor will have a right to the excess beyond the
debt and interest, etc. the debtor after assigning to the creditor
as security. may assign his residual interest as security for a-debt,
to another creditor, or absolutely, as payment of the debt.6 7 In

'Life Ins. Co. v. Robertshaw, 26 Pa. 189; Cunningham v. Smith, 70
Pa. 450; Corson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438; Mut. Assn. v. Beaverson, 16 W. N.
188.
. McHale v. McDonnell, 175 Pa. 632.
'Schaak v. Meiley, 136 Pa. 161; Grant v. Kline, 115 Pa. 618.
"Cunningham v. Smith, 70 Pa. 450. In a suit between the creditor
who has received the money on the policy and the administrator of the
debtor, the creditor must show what the amount of the debt is.
'Schaak v. Meiley, 136 .Pa. 161.
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a suit against the company, the debt being the insurable interest
relied upon, the creditor must prove that he was such.6 8 Should
the debt be paid, for which the policy had been assigned as security, and should the premiums have all been paid by the debtor, the
proceeds of the policy will belong to the latter. Cf. Corson's
appeal; 113 Pa. 438.
BEING SURETY.

If one is merely a surety for another, he may take an insurance on the life of that other, although no"breach of the contract
completing the liability of the surety, has occured. 9 In Scott v.
Dickson 0 the company had paid a policy to Scott, and the administrator of Dickson, the insured, sought to recover the whole of it
from him. Scott, at the time of becoming interested in the policy,
was a surety, on an official bond for Dickson. This bond had never
been broken by Dickson so that Scott never fell under a perfected
liability. It was alleged against Scott's right to the money, that he
had no insurable interest. Paxson, J. maintains that there was
such an interest; and the fact that it had become extinct before or
by the death of Dickson, did not impair the right of Scott. He
supposes that A is a creditor of B to the extent of $1000; and
insures B's life to that extent. He continues the policy until he
has paid in premiums $1100. B then pays the debt. If, he says, the
policy ceases as soon as the debt is paid, .A loses all he has paid,
and in reality is out of pocket $100, although he has received his
debt in full. The supposition was entirely irrelevant. Scott paid
none of the premiums. Dickson owed him nothing. Then why
was he allowed to keep $4011, the sum which he had received
from the company? If instead of being in danger of having to
pay money for Dickson, Scott had actually paid for him $400, he
could not ,according to the rule of the court, be entitled to retain
more than the $400 plus the interest on it for the expectancy of
Dickson, since not he but Dickson had paid all the premiums.
"Brady v. Prudential Ins. Co., 5 Kulp. 505. Facts inconsistent with the
plaintiff's belief that he was a creditor and-with his present testimony, may
be elicited on cross examination; Mullen v. Ins. Co., 182 Pa. 150.
'Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775; Corson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438.
108 Pa. 6.

Concluded in next issue.
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MOOT COURT.
BOPP vs. TIMLER.
Accommodation Note.

Parole Evidence to Show Fraudulent

Use.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Bopp executed a promissory note to Timler, payable in three months.
for $300. Bopp contends that the note was made for the accommodation
of Timler to enable him to get it discounted.. The Court rejected the
evidence because it contradicted the writing. Motion for a new trial.
COLLm for Plaintiff.
H ss for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
EASTER, J.-In this case presented to us we find that Timler being in
need of money, evidently to meet some obligation, applies to Bopp, his
friend, for a loan of $300. Bopp no doubt has been unable to loan Timler
the cash, but he has a financial standing in the community by which, if
he makes a promissory note payable to Timler, he (Timler) will be able to
ward off his creditors for the time being. At the ehd of three months
T;mler calls on Bopp to pay the note given for his accommodation. Bopp
of course refuses to pay or accede to such a demand. Timler sues, and
the trial judge refuses to admit evidence which would show the true
relations of the parties, and in this we think there was error.
Generally, parole evidence is not admissible to explain or change the
terms of a written instrument, the courts holding that, what the parties intended to be embodied in the agreemrent was in fact placed there.
Exceptions are made in case of fraud, accident, or mistake.
In this case, however, there is the making of an instrument without
consideration, with no expectation of its be-ng enforced, the maker relying on the party accommodated to be able to meet his obligation and never
to make use of the instrument.
An accommodation bill is an instrument to which the accommodating
party, be he acceptor, drawer or endorser; has put his name, without
consideration, for the purpose of benefiting or accommodating some
other party, who desires to raise money on it, and is to provide for the
bill when due. Wood's, Byles' Bills and Notes, p. 223.
Between the parties to an accommodation note, an agreement that
the payee shall not call on the maker is wholly unnecessary and it is
unusual for the maker to demand any assurance on this point. He need
only show the real character of the note and the law relieves him from
such obligation, and also from liability to a third party who receives the
note after maturity. Louck v. Lightner, 11 Sup. 499.
The English courts recognize the doctrine that parol evidence. may
be introduced to show a want of consideration and those courts apply
the general rule more strictly than the American courts. In Thompson v.
Clubley, 1 Mees. & W. 212, there was an action brought by the indorsee
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against the acceptor of a bill of exchange. It was held that the acceptor
might show that the acceptance was for the accommodation of the plaintiff
and that the defendant had received no consideration from the drawer;
and also that it was agreed, when due, the bill should be taken up by the
plaintiff.
The view of the Federal Courts on this question is in these words,-"The true relation of parties to a negotiable instrument may, as between
the parties themselves, be proved by parol evidence, whenever it is necessaty to a correct determination of the right or liability of either of them
thereon, and this may be done to give jurisdiction to a Federal Court'
Goldsmith v. Holmes, 36 Sup. 484.
Turning to the Pennsylvania Courts we find numerous cases supporting this doctrine. We shall cite several to show how firmly the doctrine
is established.
Where a note is drawn and accepted without consideration, and
although the burden of proving such want of consideration is on the
drawer, yet when established it is unquestionably an available defence
to the drawer. Grubb v. Cottrell, 62 Pa. 23. As against the accommodated party, the accommodating party may set up the want of consideration. Peale v. Addicks, 174 Pa. 543. 38 W. C. N. 101.
In Abraham v. Mitchell, 112 Pa. 23, the court holds, "In an action
against an endorser upon a promissory note an affidavit of the defense
is sufficient that avers that the defendant endorsed the note at the
plaintiff's request, without consideration, and solely for the plaintiff's
accommodation." This same doctrine is held in 174 Pa. 543.
The cases in this state in which parol evidence has been allowed to
contradict the terms of written instruments, may be. classed under two
heads: 1st, where there has been fraud, accident or mistake in the
creation of the instrument itself, and 2nd, where there has been an attempt to make a fraudulent use of the instrument in violation of a promise or .an agreement made at the time the instrument was signed, and
without which it would not have been executed. The English rule excluding parole evidence to vary a contract, has not been adopted in this
state in all its stringency. Gundy v. Weckerly, 220 Pa. 292. This case also
holds that where a person is induced by a contemporaneous parol promise, a subsequent breach of the promise is a fraud upon his rights, and
he may set up the breach as a defence to the note and prove the promise
by parol evidence. Where the defendant sets up in his affidavit of
defense the promise and the breach thereof and avers that he expects
to prove the facts avowed, the presumption is that he will do so at the
trial.
Parol evidence is admissible to show a verbal contemporaneous
agreement which induced the execution of a written obligation, though
it may vary or change the terms of the written contract. Juniata Building
Association v. Hetzel, 103 Pa. 507. The courts hold that it is plain fraud
to secure the execution of an instrument by representations as to the
manner in which payment shall be made, differing in important particulars
from those contained in the paper, and, after the paper has been signed,
attempt to compel literal compliance with its terms regardless of the
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contemporaneous agreement without which it would never have been
signed at all. Keough vs. Leslie, 92 Pa. 424; Martin vs. Freedenber,
169 Pa. 447; Coal & Iron Co. vs. Willing, 180 Pa. 165.
In view of the doctrine held out in the cases cited, we hold that we.
were in error in not allowing the defendant to introduce the parol evidence.
A new trial is granted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Timler, in writing promised to pay to Bopp $300 He offered to
prove that the promise was made, in order that Bopp might negotiate it;
and for no other purpose; that, in fact, Timler really promised to pay
$300 to any endorsee of Bopp, but not to Bopp himself. If this were so,
the promise would be unenforceable by Bopp. It would not really have
been made to pay him. Nor would there have been a consideration for a
promise to pay him.
That the evidence offered contradicted, or essentially varied the
promise expressed in the instrument, is clear. It was atot for that reason
to be rejected. The real intention of the parties may not be expressed
in a writing, and, when that is so, the attempt to enforce the writing
according to its tenor, would be a fraud. To prevent the court's being
made instrumental in giving effect to such fraud, evidence of the real
intention of the parties must be admitted. Cf. Barnet v. Offerman, 7 W.
130; Bower v. Hastings, 36 Pa. 285; Peale v. Addicks, 174 Pa. 543;
Fidelity Co. v. Harder, 212 Pa. 96. 6 P. & L. Dig. col. 10255.
The opinion of the learned court below, when granting a new trial,
sufficiently vindicates its action.
Judgment affirmed.

JOHN HUNTER v. HORACE HAMMOND.
Usury-Status

in Pennsylvania of Usurious Contract Made

Elsewhere.
STATEMENT

OF FACTS.

Hammond in Arkansas made a bond for $1000, "payable 3 years after
date to Hunter in the city of Philadelphia, at 8% interest per annum until
paid." Suit was brought on it one year after maturity in the city of
Philadelphia. The court refused to allow the jury to give more than 6%
interest. Motion for a new trial.
BELL for Plaintiff.
MILLER for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
WOODWORD, J.-This record does not disclose whether the action
was brought in a state court, or. in a court of the United States. It is
a case over which the United States Courts have constitutional jurisdiction. Art. 3, Sec. 2, U. S. Cons. Were we to choose the course of
least resistence and treat the appeal as directed to a federal court, the
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question presented would involve no difficulty. Under a long line of
decisions the plaintiff would be clearly entitled to recover the rate of
interest stipulated.
But considering the action as brought in a Common Pleas Court of the
Commonwealth. of Pennsylvania, and appealed therefrom, we are confronted with an array of confusing and conflicting decisions and dicta.
The Am. Encyc. of Law summarizes thus, "It must be stated generally that
the validity of a contract as affected by the laws 'of the various jurisdictions against usury is to be determined by the place where the contract
is made, if that place is also the place of performance. But there is much
confusion of the authorities as to what law will control if- the place of
the contract and the place of performance are different. In some places
it is held that the law of the place where the contract is to be performed
is to be applied. In other places the question is held to be settled by the
law of the place where the contract is made and consideration paid. But,
according to the weight of authority the question is dependent upon the
express or presumed intention of the parties. According to this rule,
where a contract is entered into in one jurisdiction to be performed in
another, at least if the contract is between the citizens of each, and it in
express terms provides for a rate of interest lawful in one jurisdiction but
unlawful in another, the parties will be presumed to contract with reference to the laws of the state where the stipulated rate is lawful, and such
terms will control until-overcome by proof that the stipulation was intended as a means to defeat the law against usury, and to support a contract
otherwise usurious." Vol. 22, p. 1331.
Two Pennsylvania cases ire cited as upholding the proposition that
the place of -performance governs. Bennett v. Building & Loan Assn., 177
Pa. 233; Nat. Building & Loan Assn. v. Riley, 4 D. R. 663.'
Passing these cases for the moment let us examine the cases cited
as being the weight of authority supporting the opposite theory, viz, that
the intention of the parties, is the criterion. The decisions of the federal
courts seems to rule this class.
In an early case we find the following principle laid down by Chief
Justice Taney, "The general principle in relation to contracts made in
one place to be executed in another is well settled. They are to be -governed by the law of the place of performance, and if the interest allowed
by the place of performance, is higher than that permitted at the place of
the contract, the parties may stipulate for the higher interest without incurring the penalties of usury." Andrews. v. Pond, 13 Pet. 64--1839.
The case cited as the earliest authority for the converse proposition,
that the parties may stipulate for interest according to the law of the
place where the contract is made, and that this rate will control, is Depeau
v. Humphreys, 8 Mart (La.) 1. Of this case a New York Chancellor,
Wolworth, says "The question was very fully and ably examined in the
supreme court of Louisiana, and the court came to the conclusion, in which
decision I fully concur, that in a note given at New Orleans, upon a loan
of money made there, the creditor might stipulate for the highest legal
rate of conventional interest allowed by the laws of the state of Louisiana,
although the rate of interest thus agreed to be paid was higher than that
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which could be taken upon a loan, by the laws of the state where such note
was made payable." Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 634--1834.
This doctrine was adopted by the federal court in Miller v. Tiffany,
1 Wall. 298. Mr. Justice Swayne in delivering the opinion adverts to
the statement made by Chief justice Taney in Andrews v. Pond, and
quoting the statement which we have given supra, he adds, "The converse
of this proposition is equally well settled. If the rate of interest be higher
at the place of the contract than at the place of performance, the parties
may lawfully contract in that case also for the higher rate." In support
of this rule he cites Depeau v. Humphrey, 20 How. 1, and Chapman v.
Robertson 6 Paige 634.
The next case in which this doctrine is commented upon is Scudder
v. Bank, 91 U. S. 411, in which Mr. Justice Hunt collates and reviews
the authorities. "The rule is often laid down that the law of the place of
performance governs the contract.**** For the purpose of payment, and
the incidents of payment, this ii a sound proposition, **** Matters bearing
upon the execution, the interpretation, and the validity of the contract are
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at
the place of performance. Matters respecting the remedy, such as the
bringing of suits, admissibl-ty of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend
upon the law of the place where the suit is brought." Scudder v. Bank,
91 U. S. 406.
The case of Cromwell v. Co. of ,Sac., 96 U. S. 51--1877, affirms the
rule laid down in Miller v. Tiffany and Scudder v. Bank.
A still later case is Sturdivant v. Memphis Nat. Bank, 9 C. C. A. 256
-- 1894, wh-ch adopts in toto the rule as laid down in Miller v. Tiffany as
quoted supra.
By this review of the decisions of the United States Courts it is
evident that in a federal court the ruling excepted to would be erronbous,
and the contention of the appellant would have to be sustained.
A very lucid statement of the points involved is found in a Vermont
case, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Redfield. "I consider the following
rules in regard to interest and contracts to be well settled. 1. If a contract be entered into in one place to be performed in another, and the rate
of interest differs in the two countries, the parties may stipulate for the
rate of interest of either country, and thus by their own express contract
determine with reference to the laws of which country that incident of
the contract shall be decided. 2. If the contract so entered into stipulate
for interest generally, it shall be the rate of interest of the place of payment, unless it appear that the parties intended to contract with reference
to the laws of the other place. 3. If the contract be so entered into, for
money at a place or on a day certain, and no interest shall be stipulated,
and payment be delayed, interest by way of damages shall be allowed
according to the law of the place of payment. Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33;
see also Butler v. Olds 11 Ia. 1.
Let us examine the Pennsylvania authorities. An examination of the
two cases cited by the Encyclopedia by -no means convinces us that they establish the unqualified proposition for which they are cited. Both were cases
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in which contracts were made by a New York corporation with a citizen
of Pennsylvania, for money payable in New York. The contracts reserved the New York rate of interest, and-the cases decide merely that
where the contract reserves a rate of interest legal at the place of performance, though higher than that allowed under the laws of Pennsylvania, the law of the place of performance will govern. Nat. Building
& Loan Ass'n v. Riley, 4 D. R. 663; Bennett v. Building & Loan Ass'n,
177 Pa. 233. But this is the doctrine laid down in Andrews v. Pond, the
converse of which was deduced by Justice Swayne in Miller v. Tiffany, 1
Wall. 298. And there is nothing in these Pennsylvania cases to indicate
that the Pennsylvania courts would not extend the rule in the same manner if the case were presented. It is interesting to note in this connection
that the court in deciding the case of Nat. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Riley,
cited as authority the portion of the opinion from Miller v. Tiffany which
we have quoted supra, thus clearly establishing the coincidence of the
views of that court with the doctrine of tfie federal courts.
In so far therefore, we do not find the decisions in conflict with the
prevailing rule.
It is the case of Burnett v. Ry. Co., 176 Pa. 45, which to our mind
governs this case, and the principle there laid down is disastrous to the
contention of the appellant.
The plaintiff therein was an employee of the defendant company. On
application, he received two passes for free transportation, one from
Trenton to Philadelphia, the terms of which did not appear in evidence,
the other an employee's pass from Philadelphia to Elmira. He was injured at Harrisburg through the admitted negligence of the company. Under
the laws of New Jersey, where the passes were issued and the contract
made, the contract by which the plaintiff, in consideration of free transportation assumed the risk of accident was valid, and in that state he
could not have recovered. Under the law of Pennsylvania the contract
exempting the company from liability was invalid. The court held that
the place of performance governed and that the plaintiff could maintain his action.
It is true that the defendant was a Pennsylvania corporation and
that the transportation was almost wholly through this state. These
facts may have influenced the court; but, looking at the decision as an
abstract principle of law, it establishes the following proposition. A contract valid in the state where made, but invalid in Pennsylvania where.
it is to be performed will not be recognized or enforced by a Pennsylvania
court.
Applying this doctrine to the facts at hand, the ruling of the court
below was correct. The contract as it stands is. invalid in so far. as it
stipulates for a rate of interest in excess of six per centum. Act May
28th, 1858, P. L. 662. Were it wholly invalid under the statute, controlled by the ruling in Burnett v. Ry. supra, we would feel constrained to
refuse to consider it. In so far as it is invalid therefore, the plaintiff cannot invoke the assistance of Pennsylvania courts to aid in its enforce-
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We are well aware that there is certain language, in the opinion handed down in the decision of the above case upon which an argument may be
based that the intention of the parties is paramount, but we cannot reconcile such a statement with the decision reached.
It would be as logical to say that the intention of Burnett and the
company was that the New Jersey law should govern, as to say in the
present suit that the intent of Hunter and Hammond was that the law of
Arkansas should control their contract. In either case the natural presumption would be that the parties intended that law to govern under
which their contract was valid and enforceable.
We have carefully examined the cases cited in support of the decision
of Burnett v. Ry. Co., viz: Brown v. Ry. Co., No. 83 Pa. 316; Waverly
Bank v. Hall, 150 Pa. 446; Mullen v. Morris, 2 Barr 85; Allshouse v.
Ramsey, 6 Whart. 331, yet none of these cases seem to lay down the principle so broadly as the case which we have considered as ruling. It is
noteworthy that in Brown v. Ry. Co. the opinion cites as authority Scudder
v. Bank, 91 U. S. 411, to which we adverted above, and which if followed
here would compel a decision in favor of the appellant. We have noticed
also that Burnett v. Ry. Co. was cited with approval in Musser v. Stauffer, 192 Pa. 198.
It may be that the supreme court when the question is squarely
presented will hold that the case of usurious interest does not properly
come under the ruling of Burnett v. Ry. Co., but we are unable to avoid
such a conclusion. Therefore the decision of the lower court is,
affirmed.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The conclusions of the learned court below must be affirmed for
two reasons. (a) It does not appear whether the law of Arkansas differs from that of Pennsylvania, with regard to usury. That being so, we
must treat the case as if there were no difference. Musser v. Stauffer,
178 Pa. 99; Bennett v. Caldwell, 70 Pa. 253; Van Auken v. Dunning, 81
Pa. 464. Harper v. Young, 112 Pa. 419. If then the Arkansas law and the
law of this state are the same, there is no pretext for allowing more than
six per cent interest to be recovered.
(b). The learned court below has satisfactorily shown that, in this
state the validity of a contract, which contemplates that performance, in
whole or in part, shall be in this state, must be decided by the law of this
state. The bond was for the payment of $1000 "in the city of Philadelphia." Our courts have not accepted the principle that the law of the
place where a contract is made, or where the loan or other consideration
passes to the obligor (Vide Minor, Conflict of Laws, 433) is to prevail,
when performance is to be made here. The clear discussion of this
question in the opinion below, dispenses us from the necessity of further
consideration of the question.
Judgement affirmed.
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JOHN MANNERS v. IGNATIUS ATMORE.
Landlord and Tenant.-Liability of Lessee After Assignment
of Term.
STATEMENT

OF FACTS.

Manners let a house to Atmore for five years, at a rental of $250 per
year. At the end of the first year, Atmore assigned the lease to one
Watkins, who agreed to pay the rent to Manners and fifty dollars per
year additional to Atmore. Manners when not paid the second year's
rent sued Watkins for it and recovered it. The third year's lrent was paid
by Watkins. At the end of the fourth year Watkins" vacated the house,
which remains unoccupied. This is a suit for the fourth year's rent. During
the third year, Watkins made some repairs, at the demand of Manners;
repairs which a tenant should make.
BRENNAN for Plaintiff
DIPPLE for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
FELTON, J.-The first question in the case before us seems to be,
whether Manners accepted Watkins as his tenant, so as to exempt Atmore
irom liability for the rent.
In this case Watkins accepted the lease with the same covenants that
Atmore had and also went into possession. So that from his acts it appears he intended to take the place of the original lessee. Now if his
acts were sufficient to relieve Atmore from responsibility, it would seem
reasonable he should be bound by the covenants in the lease, provided
however that Manners expressly or impliedly accepted him as tenant,
thus releiving the original lessee from his duty to Manners.
The facts show that Manners brought suit against the assignee for
the rent that accrued the first year he was-in possession; and also accepted
the second year's rent from him, which we believe to be sufficient evidence,
that Manners intended to accept the assignee as his tenant, and to release
the lessee from his responsibility.
It is well settled that covenants to pay rent run with the land and
the assignee of a lease of land is liable to the lessor for the payment of
all rents which accrue while he holds the assignment of the lease. 139
Pa. 341.
In the case before the court the assignee still held the lease when the
rent became due, as neither Manners or the lessee had done anything to
release him from responsibility.
Suppose A, the original lessee is to pay $300 rent per year. He leases
for five years, but at the end of the first year he assigns his lease to B, because he, A, can rent another property for $100. We think it would be absurd
that in the case supposed the lessor could -not hold B for the rent. 12 Ind.
408; 5 Wis. 600; 14 Wis. 295.
While it may be argued there is no express covenant in this case,
there is surely no doubt as to its being an implied one. As such the
liability of the tenant is founded on privity of estate, and determines
upon the assignment of the lease to another, and does not survive the
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acceptance of rent by the lessor from the assignee. 13 Iowa 42.
If this rent had accrued before the assignee obtained title, it is clear
he would not have been liable, as ,there would have been no privity of
estate. But here the rent accrued while assignee held the lease and he
is liable. 123 Penna. 576; 3 W. & S. 531
We do not think there would have been any doubt as to who is liable
for the rent, if the lessor had cotisented by express words to accept the
assignee and thereby release the lessee. But in the absence of express
wbrds it seems evident by his actions, that he intended to accept the
assignee as his tenant, 30 Ohio State, 569.
It is a well settled rule that by the privity of estate between assignee
of a leasehold and the lessor, such assignee becomes personally liable to
the lessor, while he holds the estate as assignee, for the performance of
the lessee's covnants which run with the land. The question of liability
of the assignee of a leasehold has arisen chiefly where it has been sought
to enforce against the assignee the liability for rent accruing during the
assignee's tenancy and he has been held personally liable. Vol 18, A. and
E. Encyc. of Law, pp. 668-609.
The majority of the cases seem to hold that an assignment of a
term and entry into possession creates privity of estate between the lessor
and assignee, and thus makes the latter liable for the rent. Some authorities
hold he cannot divest himself of the legal title and right of possession
after he has taken pbssession of the leased premises. 66 Cal. 223; 91 Cal.
223.
The fact that Watkins only occupied the premises for two years,
and then abandoned them before the whole term of the lease had expired;
does not relieve him of his responsibility to the lessor for rent. 1 Gray
(Mass.) 332; 22 Pick. (Mass.) 565.
Here the assignee received an absolute assignment of the lease from
the lessee, because hd assigned all his rights and interests in the premises
to Watkins. So the assignee would seem liable for the rent. 50 Mo. 319;
17 Mo. 148; 55 0. State 161.
Some courts have gone much farther than this- and held the assignee
liable for rent, where he purchased at sheriff's sale. 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 518;
15 0. State 186.
According to the decisions of the cases cited, we think the assigne
should be liable for the rent, and the suit should be against him.
Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
We are unable to sustain the judgment of the learned court below.
A lessee cannot discharge his obligation to pay the rent, by assigning the
term. The assignee assumes a collateral liability for such rent as falls due
during his ownership of the term, but that of the lessee continues likewise.
It follows that the landlord may sue either or both, for rent. His suit
of one is not an election to discharge the other, as respects the rent sued
for, even; still less for other rent. When Manners sued Watkins, le did
not deprive himself of the right, should his suit be abortive, to pursue
Atmore for the same rent. He is not suing Atmore for the same rent, but
for rent accruing subsequently.
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The learned court below has discovered in Manners' action against
the lessee's assignee, and in his receipt of a year's rent from the assignee,
a release of the lessee. We cannot find it there. He had a right to get
two years' rent from Watkins, and the fourth year's rent from Atmore;
doing the former cannot be tortured into a waiver of the right to do the
latter. Consult cases cited in Trickett, Landlord and Tenant, p. 374.
Shand v. McClosky, 27 Super. 260; "The assignment of a lease does not
annul the lessee's obligation or his express covenant to pay rent, even
though the lessor has assented to such assignment and collected rent from
the assignee, unless the lessor has accepted the surrender of the lease, and
released the original lessee." 24 Cyc. 1177.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. it.

COMMONWEALTH v. CLARENCE VERNON.
Violation of Liquor Laws by Agent. Indictment of Principal.
STATEMENT

OF FACTS.

Vernon licensed to sell liquor, as a hotel-keepergave strict instructions
to his bartender to sell to no minor, habitual drunkard, on Sunday or
election days, etc. This instruction was observed, until six (6) months
afterwards, a minor offered him a dollar ($1) if he would furnish him a
drink ordinarily costing fifteen (.15) cents, the minor also paying the
fifteen (.15) cents. The object was that the bartender keep the($1) one
dollar for himself and not account for it to Vernon. This purpose was
carried out.
This is an indictment for the sale of liquor to a minor.
ORcuTr for Commonwealth.
UMBENIIAUER

for Defendant.

BUCKLEY, J.-It appears that Vernon, as a hotel keeper was licensed
to sell li4uor. He gave strict instructions to his bartender not to sell to
any minor or habitual drunkard, nor on Sunday, election day, etc. The
bartender for the sum of one dollar and fifteen cents (the fifteen cents
being paid for the drink) sold liquor to a minor on Sunday.
It seems that the defendant in this case acted in good faith when he
gave such instructions to his bartender. In civil actions, generally speaking, a master is liable for the wrongs of his servant whether authorized by him or not, which are done in the course of the servant's
employment and of the master's business. Burdick on Torts, p. 130. If
the principal, in fact as well as in form, forbids his employes to sell illegally, he will not be guilty for a sale made by them against his will or
in violation of his will. Trickett on Criminal Law, p. 338.
In Zeigler v. Commonwealth, 22 W. N. 111, it was held that if a sale
be made by an agent against the authority of his lahdlord and without
his knowledge, he would not, of course, be criminally responsible.
Altho there is no doubt in our minds that a master is liable for the
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wrongs done by his servant in civil actions, whether authorized by him or
not, yet it is not the rule in criminal actions.
The law is very well laid down in the case of Commonwealth v
Junkin, 170 Pa. 195 where the court held'that whatever may be the answerability of the principal for the wrongful acts of his agent in civil actions,
he is not answerable criminally, when the act is in positive disobedience
of his explicit orders.
There is no question here but that the defendant acted in good faith
and it was held in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2 Super. 317, that every
lawful instruction from principal to agent is considered to be given in
good faith until the contrary is shown.
Ordinarily, the principal is not held criminally responsible for the
acts of his servant or agent, unless he in some way participates in, countenances, or approves the criminal act of the agent. Nor can a principal be
held criminally liable for the acts of his agent in opposition to his will
and against his orders. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2 Super. 317.
The fact that the bartender took the dollar and did not account
for it to Vernon, shows that the act was his own and not that of
Vernon.
The defendant is indicted under the 17th Sect. of the Act of May 13,
1887, but we cannot'see in what manner he has violated the statute and
therefore, we think there can be no conviction.
The verdict must be for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Under the influence of a bribe, offered by a minor, the agent of
the defendant sold to him some liquor. The bribe, $1.00, was retained by
the agent. For the price of the liquor, 15 cents, he properly accounted
Sales to minors had been expressly and in good faith forbidden by the
defendant, and the agent exhibited his belief in the good faith of ihe
prohibition, by actually refraining from such sales through the period
of six months. The question then is, is the principal criminally liable
for the, by him, forbidden act of his agent? The learned court below has
decided that he is not. We are satislied with its reasoning and with
the authorities cited by it.
Judgment affirmed.

BOOK REVIEWS.
Constable's Guide; The Law of Constables in Pennsylvania,
by WILLIAM F. DILL. Second edition by D. CLARE GOOD, 1909.

T. and J. W. Johnson Co., Philadelphia.
This is a small, but an exceedingly good book, It exhibits
the whole law concerning the duties and power of constables;
their election and term of office; writs and their service; levy
and sale in execution; duties in distress proceedings; in elections;
in respect to various crimes, etc. The principles are clearly
stated, and the authorities in support of them, cited. The aim
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of the editor of the second edition is declared
make the book not only useful for constables,
able to the legal profession." It can be said
well realized. The book is a very convenient
no less than for the officers.

by him to be "to
but also services
that this aim in
one for lawyers

Practi:al Suggestions for Drawing Wills and the Settlemetof Estates in Pennsylvania, by JOHN MARSHALL GST, of the

Philadelphia Bar. 1909. T. & J. W. Johnson Co.
This little book, of 150 pages, is one of the most fascinating
and, at the same time, instructive and serviceable books that we
have encountered. It makes many practical suggestions which
are of value, not merely to the testator, but to his legal counsel.
The first part deals with the drawing of wills; the second, with
the settlement of estates. More wisdom and wit, in the same
space, it would be difficult to find in any legal or quasi-legal
work. A. important statutes are referred to, and practical
warnings and admonitions expressed in the most striking and
piquent way appear on every page. We most heartily recommend this book to every lawyer and to almost every layman.

